From local clientelism to populism – the case of Radu Mazăre by Pandelea, Sabin & Mieczkowski, Robert
DOI:10.1515/curie-2015-0016
A N N A L E S
U N I V E R S I TAT I S  M A R I A E  C U R I E - S K Ł O D O W S K A
LUBLIN – POLONIA
VOL. XXII, 1 SECTIO K  2015
Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest, Romania  
Institute of Political Science, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University, Warsaw, Poland 
SABIN PANDELEA,  
ROBERT MIECZKOWSKI
From local clientelism to populism – the case of Radu Mazăre 
ABSTRACT
The fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe imposed not only a transition towards a new 
regime, but also the reconstruction of the democratic institutions. That meant, as Peter Mair puts it, that the 
firsts to come to power had the great advantage of shaping the administration and government agencies for 
their own benefit. This consequently led to establishing clientelistic networks and party patronage by spoiling 
offices. At the same time, the new post-communist democracies had to transform themselves, from a totalitar-
ian regime with a unique party which controlled merely every aspect of politics and society, into pluralistic 
societies with multiparty systems. That also meant that the political actors had to win their positions through 
an open and democratic electoral process, thus having to create electoral linkages in order to secure their sits. 
Many local political figures in post-communist Romania interpreted this new situation by buying the votes 
and by establishing clientelistic linkages, based on offering various goods, favors or social security benefits 
in the exchange of the vote and of the electoral support. These practices led to the emergence of powerful 
local political elites, with increased popular support and significant influence in the party structure due to their 
electoral linkages, the so-called local barons. This paper seeks to explore the connection between such local 
electoral clientelistic networks and the populist approach employed by the respective local political elites. 
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INTRODUCTION
The nature of the Romanian post-communist state was shaped by the forma-
tion of the National Salvation Front (Romanian: Frontul Salvării Naționale, FSN), 
a provisional body that was established to ensure the first steps towards transition 
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to democracy, which inherited the former PCR local structure. Albeit its initial com-
mitment to dissolve after providing the interim government, the Front transformed 
itself into a political party which dominates the Romanian party system ever since.1 
This gave the FSN a unique role, not only in administrative and governance aspects, 
but also in structuring the new institutions, as well legislation, for its own benefit. 
This situation, specific to the countries at the beginning of their democratic transi-
tion as Peter Mair underlines, meant also unlimited and unrestricted access to state 
resources and offices [Mair 1997: 172]. Consequently, the FSN developed strong 
local electoral linkages, managing to use the inherited former PCR structure for their 
own electoral benefit. This meant not only unlimited access to offices and state re-
sources, but also a primacy in ‘converting’ the former PCR members to the FSN, thus 
offering the potential of developing large membership. This organizational feature, 
together with the new democratic framework that imposed a reconsideration of how 
party(ies) relates to citizens led to establishing primarily clientelistic linkages. This 
situation can be explained by several factors, that we are going to further develop 
in a following section. It is therefore important to see how the linkages between the 
party(ies) and the citizens changed in the context of democratization and transition 
from a single party to a multi-party system and, moreover, what were the factors 
that influenced these changes. In this paper, we firstly explore the conceptual debate 
regarding clientelism, focusing afterwards on the cases of certain local political fig-
ures that managed to secure their sits for more than three consecutive mandates and 
withal have a significant influence in both local and central politics. Furthermore, we 
analyze the populist stance employed by these political figures. Finally, we attempt 
to provide the main features identified in the cases of local barons. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this paper, we will employ the concept of clientelism as developed by Kitschelt 
and Wilkinson. According to their view, clientelism is ‘a particular mode of ex-
change between electoral constituencies as principals and politicians as agents in 
democratic systems’ [Kitschelt, Wilkinson 2007: 7]. Before starting any discussion 
on local electoral clientelism, we should underline the distinction existing between 
clientelism and patronage. Although these two concepts are rarely employed with 
different meanings, we use here the term of clientelism to refer to those particular 
exchange relations used as an electoral resource, that is, to gain votes and electoral 
support. Therefore, our use here differs from that of patronage, which refers to ex-
1 It dissolved in April 1992, after splitting between Ion Iliescu camp and that of Petre Roman, lead-
ing to the formation of two of the most important political parties: PSD and PD. PSD managed to be either 
on the first, or on the second place in all the post 1992 elections (it was only once on the second place 
(1996 – when it faced a large center-right coalition; in 2008, it scored the biggest electoral score, but after 
redistribution it had fewer seats than PDL). 
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change relations used as organizational resource (i.e., in controlling the process of 
policy making) [Kopecký, Mair, Spirova 2012: 3–10].
Electoral clientelism, as described by Kitschelt and Wilkinson, focuses on the 
relation between citizens and parties or political figures, emphasizing the impact 
of exchanging various goods or benefits for vote. This consequently led to the es-
tablishment of a clientelistic-type accountability, based on a relation of transaction 
between the citizen and the political actor, the first offering his vote in exchange of 
direct payments or access to jobs, services or various goods [Kitschelt, Wilkinson 
2007: 2]. Nonetheless, this is not the only model for voter-party linkages, Kitschelt 
identifies two other main types [Kitschelt 2000: 849]. On the one hand, there are 
the programmatic linkages, based primarily on the development of problem-solving 
programs addressing the main issues existing within the society. This type of linkages 
demands more time and does not provide certain and direct incentives for voters, as 
clientelistic linkages. Another model for voter-party relation is that of charismatic 
linkages. In this case, the option of a certain citizen for a specific political figure is 
determined primarily by the personal charisma of the politician. 
The dominant party-voter linkage model selected after 1989 was the clientelistic 
model, which eventually led to the rise of some very influential local political elites, 
the so-called ‘local barons’. We focus here on the cases of these political figures, 
using the case of Constanţa mayor, Radu Mazăre, as illustrative for our research. 
Nonetheless, we underline the fact that the term used here, local barons, it is a term 
used by the press to describe these more and more influential local political elites. 
CASE STUDY
It is relevant for our study to underline some specific features of the Romanian 
post-communist parties that had an imprint on the way the linkage with the voters 
was established. First of all, as we have mentioned earlier, the Romanian party-system 
was dominated in the first post-communist years by the FSN and its PCR-inherited 
organizational structure, which developed mostly clientelistic linkages. This con-
sequently pushed the other parties that formed the opposition (represented mainly 
by the so-called historical parties: national-liberals, PNL, and national-peasants, 
PNŢ-CD) which developed programmatic linkages2 to embrace in some cases the 
clientelistic alternative. 
These strong local political elites adopted a populist rhetoric, presenting them-
selves as defenders of the local interests against the central politicians, as well as 
benefactors of the impoverished. One such example is the case of mayor of the 
port-city of Constanţa, Radu Mazăre. Since 2000, [Kitschelt 2000: 849] (the year 
2 Their programmes were based on the call for further democratization, returning to monarchy and 
privatization of the state companies. 
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Mazăre was elected), eight times a year, the municipality distributes food packages 
to elderly people with pensions lower than 900 lei (cca. 200 euros), all the costs of 
this action being covered by the local budget. On the official website of the institu-
tion, the action is presented as the consequence of the personal interest of Mazăre in 
helping those in need, this being ‘a major concern’ of the mayor. We can observe in 
this case both a populist rhetoric and the use of state resources for gaining popular 
support. In a similar approach, other mayors, usually from small cities, use the Eu-
ropean Program of Food Aid to the Most Deprived Persons, which basically consists 
in offering various food items for the vulnerable sectors of the society provided by 
the EU, as personal ‘gifts’ offered on the behalf of the mayor.3 
We can identify specific populist elements in the discourse employed by Mazăre, 
one of them being the differentiations between politics and administration. Thus, 
he presents himself not as a politician, but rather as a good administrator who has 
team player qualities, making his decisions not by consulting with specialists, but by 
talking directly to people.4 Maybe the most representative example of populism and 
clientelism in the case of Mazăre is the construction of a social buildings complex. 
Presented as a result of the direct care of the mayor, the project offers shelter for some 
hundred disadvantaged social categories, who, in return, showed their support when 
their ‘benefactor’ was investigated by the anti-corruption department,5 claiming that 
the mayor ‘helped them and offered a place to stay’. When he was eventually released 
from temporarily detention, the people living in the social neighborhood greeted him, 
while he declared that ‘will continue the project to show that something good for the 
unfortunate people can be done in this country, although the authorities want to stop 
the project’.6 In a similar vein, he built several clubs for the pensioners, which brings 
him strong support from this social category side, as he mentions himself.7 More 
interestingly, working on ‘charity’ projects was how he started his first campaign 
for the mayorship of Constanţa, in 2000, when he founded a children playground 
in one of the city’s neighborhoods, using his own funds.8 When campaigning in the 
respective area, he was greeted with cheers by the thankful crowd. 
3 http://www.primaria-constanta.ro/machete/Macheta2.aspx?machetaID=2&paginaID=271&deta-
liuID=659&lang=ro (access 06.06.2014).  
4 http://www.agerpres.ro/politica/2013/05/28/interviu-radu-mazare-stiu-sa-fac-echipa-sunt-un-
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The local barons are behaving as patrons. Portraying in benefactors of the so-
ciety, they embrace populism as a way to secure their positions and further enhance 
their influence. This can be seen also as a protection measure from the power of the 
party.9 Moreover, by adopting this approach, they develop a strong position within 
the community. The populist stance that we have observed earlier also increases the 
popularity of the central party at the local level, while transforming the barons in 
brokers that transfer their own electoral capital to central politics in national elec-
tions, while using their influence as a bargain tool for further obtaining favors (be 
it legislative, offices, goods or other facilities) for their own clients or for their own 
benefit, from the central structures of the party. 
Although there is an increased importance of charismatic linkages, due to the 
populist rhetoric employed, we cannot discuss about a shift from clientelism to cha-
risma when it comes to attracting votes in the case of local barons, but more about 
a diversification of the linkages. Moreover, the programmatic side of the linkages 
is quasi-absent, as the respective local political elites do not have clear political 
programs, but just general electoral promises. Yet, there is no single linkage model, 
but rather parallel models used at the same time. Consequently, although the local 
barons employ primarily clientelistic linkages, and, in the latter years, tend to devel-
op also strong charismatic linkages, they also have (quasi) programmatic elements 
used in parallel. 
We identify several explanations for the initial preference for developing clien-
telistic voter-party, citizen-elite, linkages. Firstly, the major post-communist party 
monopolized the access to state resources, as well the local organizational structure 
of the former PCR, thus having both the financial, institutional and organizational 
resources for both exchange goods and benefits, as well the means to fulfill these ex-
changes. This consequently constrained the small and resourceless opposition parties, 
which had a strong programmatic appeal (calling for further democratization, return 
to monarchy, privatization of the state companies) to develop in some cases similar 
clientelistic relations. Secondly, the success of the clientelistic approach adopted 
by the local political elites can be also explained by the attitudes existing in the 
Romanian society towards state and politics in general, and politicians in particular. 
Thus, we identify two sets of explanations for adopting clientelistic linkages – one 
rationalist, explaining the parties and local political elites behavior, and another one 
culturalist, explaining the citizens’ behavior. The local political elites used the access 
granted by the party to state resources and public offices in order to exchange time 
9 This is similar in the case of the Romanian Orthodox Church. Some priests became very popular 
and use this asset to maintain their positions when clerical superiors decide their removal or movement 
to another church/perish. The Romanian media presents numerous cases. See, for instance, the case of 
Saint Mina perish, Constanţa, and the conflict between the Archdiocese, on the one hand, and parish-
ioners and priest N. Picu, on the other: http://adevarul.ro/locale/constanta/exclusiv-tulburare-mare-sfan-
tul-mina-preotul-nicolae-picu-indepartat-biserica-1_51223c4400f5182b8576378f/index.html (access 
06.06.2014). 
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for votes, as a cost-efficient method to secure their positions. Citizens, on the other 
hand, exploited the opportunity of having direct and immediate benefits from their 
right to vote, in contrast to uncertain and time-consuming programmatic benefits. 
This situation is specific for the transition from a totalitarian communist regime 
to democracy. We have to take into consideration the fact that the Romanian com-
munist state built a patrimonial structure when relating to society, the single party 
being the broker between the society and state. Thus, for significant segments of the 
post-communist Romanian society, it came naturally to have specific patrimonial 
and clientelistic demands from authorities in general, and politicians in particular. 
This situation was also boosted by the attitude adopted by the new party in power 
between 1990 and 1996, crucial years for the process of democratic transition that 
shaped the legislative framework, as well as the institutional outlook, but, moreover, 
the way political parties approached policy-making process and the linkages with 
the citizens.10
CONCLUSIONS 
We identify several features of the Romanian local barons. First of all, although 
there were some cases prior to 2000, the influential, local political elites start to 
appear usually after 2000, and consist mainly of mayors of the county capitals and 
presidents of the County Boards.11 Secondly, they are backed by a strong party, which 
is also protecting them when legal issues concerning their activities appear or when 
enhancing their access to state assets or resources by adopting favorable legislation.12 
Thirdly, they have a strong position locally, being influential in local politics, and, at 
the same time, controlling the activity of the party at the local level. This also implies 
an increased popular support, the local barons having most of the times secured their 
seats for two, three or even four times in a row.13 This position gives them a unique 
broker position, making the transition (and controlling the relationship) between 
the local vote machine and the national candidates nominated by the central party. 
This consequently increases the influence of the respective local political elites. Last 
but not least, the local barons employ a populist rhetoric, portraying themselves as 
10 Thomas Gallagher refers to the 1990–1996 government policy as a policy of society dependency 
on state. See Thomas Gallagher, Furtul unei natiuni. Romania de la communism incoace, Humanitas, 
Bucharest, 2004, pp. 23–26. 
11 Regarding the presidents of the County Boards, it should be mentioned that before 2008 they were 
appointed, while after the 2008 reform their seat was gained by universal vote.
12 One such an example of central party adopting policies favorable to local politicians is the de-
centralization attempt of the Constanţa harbor, which may be transferred from central administration to 
local, hence increasing the mayor’s position. See http://www.gandul.info/politica/ponta-ar-vrea-sa-ii-dea-
lui-mazare-portul-constanta-10695156 (access 06.06.2014). 
13 The case of Mazăre is again quite telling. He managed to win the last two elections (2012 and 
2008) in the first round, with over 60% of the total votes. See http://roaep.ro/alegeri (access 06.06.2014). 
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workers for the benefit of the community, facing the shortcomings of the political 
system in their struggle to improve the standard of living. 
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